In answer to yesterday’s question: “How are we to account for the relation between thought and being when they have been identified as opposites with no common thread; with no ‘connection’?”
Spinoza answers that the question itself has not been properly posed. Thought and extension are not seperate, but are two attributes (expressions, properties, or manifestations) of the same substance: real infinite Nature.
“That was Spinoza’s standpoint, a circumstance that seemingly gave Engels grounds for replying categorically and unambiguously to Plekhanov when he asked: ‘So in your opinion old Spinoza was right in saying that thought and extension were nothing but two attributes of one and the same substance?’ “Of course,” answered Engels, “old Spinoza was quite right”.’”
This, however, is not to say that human thought is “in the world”; rather (and here I will employ A. N. Whitehead’s terminology), the world (substance) has “sensitivity” and “materiality” — The more complex the entity (e.g. a human), the more complex the “thought”. So, for instance, an atom has both characteristics of “sensitivity” and “materiality”, or in the language of the time, it has both “thought” and “extension”.
This distinction between human thought and thought in the world is well exemplified in this passage: “Spinoza said more than once that it was impermissible to represent thought as attribute in the image and likeness of human thought; it was only the universal property of substance that was the basis of any ‘finite thought’, including human thought, but in no case was it identical with it. To represent thought in general in the image and likeness of existing human thought, of its modus, or ‘particular case, meant simply to represent it incorrectly, in ‘an incomplete way’, by a ‘model’, so to say, of its far from most perfected image (although the most perfected known to us).”
This is reminiscent of Plato, who held that the world was knowable because it was imbued with thought.
Another important point in this essay is that thinking is identified as action.